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Recent Developments
The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the
United States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent
Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality
and Administrative Efficiency?
Brad Pedersen* & Vadim Braginsky**
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent reform in the United States was the focus of a
major legislative push in 2005 with the introduction of the
Patent Reform Act of 2005 in the House of Representatives.1
The bill was introduced by Representative Lamar Smith,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property, and was cosponsored by five other House
Representative Howard Berman, one of the
members.2
cosponsors and former chair of the subcommittee, commented
that the motivations behind the reform bill were to alleviate
concerns about patent quality and patent litigation abuse and
to take steps toward global patent harmonization.3 Ultimately,
work on the bill was sidelined in the fall due in part to
apparent disagreements among the various industry groups
backing the legislation.4 Still, the patent reform movement
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1. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
2. See 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
3. See id.
4. See J. Matthew Buchanan, House Subcommittee Hearing on Patent
Reform
–
Compromise
and
Controversy,
Sept.
15,
2005,
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continues to carry substantial momentum, as exemplified by
the recent proposed changes to U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) rules,5 and the introduction this year of a
Senate bill advocating changes to the patent system6 and
another version of a patent reform bill in the House.7 In this
climate, we are virtually assured of continuing reform efforts.
The changes introduced in 2005 are comprehensive in
nature and would have a significant impact on how businesses,
both large and small, use U.S. patent laws. One of the most
significant proposed changes in the Patent Reform Act was a
switch from the current “first-to-invent” standard to a “first-tofile” standard in determining who should be awarded a patent.8
Another bill, as part of recently introduced legislation in the
Senate, also advocates adoption of a first-to-file standard.9 The
first-to-file system is presently the standard being used in both
Japan and Europe, and proponents view the switch to a first-tofile standard as an important step in harmonizing our patent
laws with the standards used in Europe and Japan.10
Regardless of which standard is viewed as better in the
long-term, it is clear that changing the current patent system
from a first-to-invent standard to a first-to-file standard will
almost certainly decrease the quality of patents and increase
http://promotetheprogress.com/archives/2005/09/house_subcommit_5.html.
5. See Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for
Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably
Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37
CFR pt. 1); Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 CFR
pt. 1).
6. See Protecting America’s Competitive Edge Through Education and
Research Act of 2006, S. 2198, 109th Cong. § 321 (2006).
7. See Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong.
(2006). The Act, introduced April 5, 2006, contains a shortened set of the
changes proposed by the 2005 Patent Reform Act. The Act does not include a
change to the first-to-file standard; however, the House Subcommittee has
scheduled hearings on this issue.
8. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
Note, however, that the Patent Act of 2005 actually adopted a modified firstto-file rule, in which a vestigial first-to-invent rule remained for those
situations in which the claimed invention was patented or described in a
printed publication or otherwise publicly known one year or less before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention.
9. See S. 2198 § 321(3)(A).
10. See 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
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the costs of patent litigation in the United States. Any time
there is a fundamental upheaval in the basic rules governing a
legal system, there is a transition cost incurred to change from
the status quo to the new system. Companies, inventors,
patent attorneys, and the USPTO will all need to learn the new
rules and new regulations will need to be created to fill the
gaps in these new laws. The costs of patent litigation in the
short term will certainly increase as the uncertainty associated
with how the new laws will be interpreted and applied by the
courts works its way through the legal system and new case
law is generated. These short-term transition costs might be
acceptable if they are ultimately outweighed by the long-term
benefits of making such a fundamental change. Unfortunately,
attempting to achieve global patent harmonization by adopting
a first-to-file standard in the United States will not achieve the
desired long-term goals of improving patent quality, improving
administrative efficiency at the USPTO, and providing a better
system for rewarding innovation.
II. FIRST-TO-INVENT AND FIRST-TO-FILE STANDARDS
“First-to-invent” and “first-to-file” represent two different
standards for determining which inventor is entitled to the
grant of a patent.11 In the United States, first-to-invent is the
established regime.12 The inventor who is first to complete the
act of invention will have superior rights to later inventors so
long as the first inventor did not abandon, suppress, or conceal
the invention.13 In the first-to-invent system, the act of filing

11. See generally 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 8:35-8:36
(4th ed. 2003).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” (emphasis added)); 35 U.S.C. §
102(g)(2) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . before such
person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another
inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.” (emphasis
added)).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). “Inventions are essentially specialized
forms or knowledge; stated in basic theoretical terms, an invention is simply
knowledge of how technology may be applied to achieve a particular beneficial
result.” 1 MOY, supra note 11, § 1:27. “Courts have repeatedly asserted that
the person who conceives of the invention is the inventor regardless of who
else contributes to the invention finally being completed. . . . [U]nder the usual
view inventorship does not attach from the act of accomplishing a reduction to
practice.” 3 MOY, supra note 11, § 10:11.

PEDERSEN-BRAGINSKY_FINAL_UPDATED

760

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

6/7/2006 6:38:28 PM

[Vol. 7:2

the patent application is not controlling, although in practice, it
usually approximates the relative dates of invention.14
Because the act of filing is not solely determinative of the
right to obtain a patent, factual issues as to the making of the
invention must be resolved in the event there is a potential
question of priority of invention.15 In cases in which two or
more applicants submit patent applications close in time and
claim the same or substantially similar subject matter,
resolution of which inventor was actually the first to invent is
handled in an administrative proceeding called an
interference.16 In patent litigation, first-to-invent issues can
arise as one of the challenges to patent validity.17 In both
forums, the inquiry as to the dates of invention involves
examining corroborating evidence.18
The first-to-file system, by contrast, rewards the act of
filing for patent protection by granting superior rights to the
inventor who first files a sufficient patent application.19 One of
the main arguments advanced in favor of the first-to-file regime
lies in the administrative efficiency of not having to resolve
factual disputes related to dates of invention.20 In theory, the

14. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36.
15. See generally id. § 8:34.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2000); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601-1.690 (2005); see also 2
MOY, supra note 11, § 8:34. An interference is a proceeding directed at
determining the first to invent as among the parties to the proceeding,
involving two or more pending applications naming different inventors or one
or more pending applications and one or more unexpired patents naming
different inventors. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i). The first of many to reduce an
invention to practice around the same time will be the sole party to obtain a
patent, unless another was the first to conceive and later coupled his
conception to his reduction to practice with reasonable diligence. See Radio
Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934); Hull v.
Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1937).
17. In such situations, an alleged infringer offers evidence to show prior
invention by someone other than the patentee. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, §
8:34.
18. See Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(stating that “[c]onception must be proved by corroborating evidence which
shows that the inventor disclosed to others his ‘complete thought expressed in
such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art to make the invention’”
(citation omitted)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (explaining that the evidence
includes “affidavits by the applicant, if possible, and one or more corroborating
witnesses, supported by documentary evidence, if available”).
19. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36.
20. See id.
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issue of which of two or more competing inventors should be
entitled to a patent for an otherwise patentable invention is
determined simply by looking to which inventor first filed a
patent application for the invention.21 Although the first-to-file
standard appears to elevate the value of filing patent
applications over the actual inventive process, first-to-file
patent systems typically include legal doctrines, such as prior
user rights, suggesting that such systems do not necessarily
value filing over inventing.22 The first-to-file standard in other
countries typically awards compulsory licenses to persons,
other than the patentee, who were sufficiently active prior to
the date on which the application for patent was filed.23 The
“net effect” is to authorize the recognition of certain rights,
albeit inferior to the patentee’s rights, in persons who were not
first to file.24
Because the first-to-invent and first-to-file standards use
such different sets of operative facts, the respective patent
systems in which these standards are implemented tend to
drive correspondingly different behaviors in those seeking to
use the patent systems. For example, an inventor operating
under the first-to-invent rules will tend to gather corroborating
evidence of the key dates and perform due diligence to support
the dates of conception and reduction to practice of an
invention.25 Under the first-to-file rules, however, inventors
will simply rush to prepare and file a patent application as soon
as practicable after conceiving of an invention, so as to preserve
their rights to obtain patent protection.26
III. DIFFERENT WAYS TO REWARD INNOVATION
Every country’s patent laws are the unique product of that
country’s socioeconomic and business environments, and they
are designed to reward innovation as part of the overall
economic, legal, and social matrix for the country. The first-to-

21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. n.11.
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Shu-Hui Chen v. Bouchard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1308-12 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
26. Cf. Charles L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 891, 895 (2000) (claiming that under a first-to-file
system “the average time between Eureka! and filing will go down in the
United States”).
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invent and first-to-file standards represent two such methods
for rewarding innovation. Over the last twenty years, a large
volume of literature has been generated arguing the pros and
cons of the two patent systems.27 The debate between these
27. See, e.g., Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File,
Mandatory Reexamination, and Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas
for Better? Or Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595 (1987); Coe A.
Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (1993);
Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes – A Proposed Re-Definition of
“First-to-Invent”, 49 ALA. L. REV. 755 (1998); Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A
Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779 (1991); Donald
R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 561 (1986); William T. Fryer, III, Patent Law
Harmonization Treaty Decision Is Not Far Off – What Course Should the U.S.
Take?: A Review of the Current Situation and Alternatives Available, 30 IDEA
309 (1989-90); Gholz, supra note 26; Gabriel P. Katona, First-to-File – Not in
the United States, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 399 (1991); Charles
R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193 (1990); Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425 (2002); Bernarr R.
Pravel, Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-File System for
Patents, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 797 (1991); Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the
United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative Law Perspective: A
Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 621 (2002); Andrew H. Thorson & John A. Fortkort, Japan’s Patent
System: An Analysis of Patent Protection Under Japan’s First-to-File System,
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 291 (1995); Edward C. Walterscheid,
Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent”
Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263 (1995); Blake R. Wiggs, Canada’s First-toFile Experience – Should the U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 493 (1991); Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority –
Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 872 (1990); Karen M. Curesky, Note, International Patent
Harmonization Through W.I.P.O.: An Analysis of the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a
“First-To-File” Patent System, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 289 (1989); Vito J.
DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed
Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687
(1992-93); Stephanie Gore, Comment, “Eureka! But I Filed Too Late . . .”: The
Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 293 (1993); Peter A. Jackman, Essay, Adoption of a First-to-File
Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67 (1997); Kim Taylor, Note,
Patent Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First to File” Debate
Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994); Linda R. Cohen & Jun Ishii,
Competition, Innovation and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
Working
Paper
05-22,
2005),
available
at
http://www.aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1215; Dave Simon, The First-toFile Provisions of the Patent Reform Act of 2005 Violate the Constitution’s
Intellectual
Property
Clause
(Nov.
2005),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841404.
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standards is often understood as a debate over whether there is
more benefit to a society in encouraging and rewarding early
disclosure of inventions versus encouraging and rewarding
early invention.
The practical effects of these different
standards impact various aspects of the innovation reward
system of a given country.
The U.S. patent system, with its first-to-invent standard
and lower costs, can be considered primarily a distributed
innovation reward system. An underlying goal of a purely
distributed innovation system is to encourage as much
innovation as possible by as many different players on the
economic stage, allowing the unseen hand of free enterprise to
determine which innovations prevail. From the standpoint of
encouraging and enabling the capitalization of inventive
activity, a distributed innovation system rewards innovation by
granting technologically broad and exclusive rights and
providing strong remedies for enforcement of those rights.28
This combination enables and encourages participation at the
grassroots level by players who do not necessarily have any
A
significant market presence or financial resources.29
distributed innovation system is designed to reward a variety of
players—universities to private enterprises, individual
inventors to multinational conglomerates—whether or not they
presently possess commercially viable technology.
In contrast, the European Union patent system with its
first-to-file standard and higher costs30 primarily exhibits
characteristics of a centralized innovation reward system. An
underlying goal of a purely centralized innovation system is to
lower the adoption costs for new innovation by facilitating and
encouraging the existing players to improve and expand their
technologies in a way that encourages disclosure and crosslicensing of new and improved technologies with other
commercial players.31 This system tends to reward technology
28. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25-55 (2004).
29. See Conley, supra note 27, at 785-86.
30. See Margaret A. Boulware et al., An Overview of Intellectual Property
Rights Abroad, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 474-75 (1994); Samson Helfgott, Why
Must Filing in Europe Be So Costly, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 787
(1994).
31. See Macedo, supra note 27, at 224 n.167; see also Richard T. Jackson,
A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 117 (2004); Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent
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possessing

IV. MOTIVATION BEHIND AND SUPPORT FOR A FIRSTTO-FILE STANDARD
The primary arguments advanced in support of choosing a
first-to-file standard over a first-to-invent standard focus on the
increased administrative efficiency and certainty of deciding
The advantages of
who should be awarded a patent.32
efficiency and certainty are touted both in terms of measuring
the validity of the patent relative to the state of the prior art
and in terms of deciding which applicant should be awarded
the patent in the situation where there are overlapping
inventions.33 The theory behind these arguments is that
increased administrative efficiency and certainty in granting
patents will lead to improved patent quality and, consequently,
decreased patent litigation costs for defending against patents
that are either invalid or indiscernible.34
A move to a first-to-file standard is also urged as a step
toward the desired goal of global harmonization of patent
laws.35 However, while the concept of global harmonization of
patent standards might be understood as an abstract goal of
governmental officials, there is more than meets the eye as to
why there is such a strong push for bringing U.S. standards in
line with the standards of Europe and Japan. There is a long
range plan of pressing for an international treaty that would
create a mutual reciprocity for patents granted in any of the big
three patent systems (United States, Europe, and Japan).36

Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1276
(citing examples of compulsory licensing in Japan, Germany, and the United
Kingdom).
32. See 2 MOY, supra note 11, § 8:36.
33. See Tatenaka, supra note 27.
34. See id. at 654-65.
35. See Pravel, supra note 27, at 800-01; see also DeBari, supra note 27;
Taylor, supra note 27.
36. See Michael D. Kaminski, Patent Harmonization: International Efforts
Are Gradually Unifying the World’s Patent Laws, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY,
Jan.
2001,
at
36,
available
at
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i01/html/patents.html; see also
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Action Paper on the Pursuit of Substantive
Patent
Law
Harmonization,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/gd1i01.htm (last modified
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This plan calls for not only reciprocal treatment of patents, but
also encourages other countries to accept patents granted by
any of these three patent systems for enforcement in those
other countries.37 The long-term effect of this harmonization
will be to bring the world one step closer to global laws and
standards governing intellectual property rights.
Clearly a system in which patents granted by any of the
big three patent offices are respected worldwide will be more
beneficial to large, multinational corporations, for which
expenses and uncertainty associated with patent rights are of
more concern. In general, larger corporations and business
groups are in support of harmonizing patent laws by adopting a
first-to-file patent system.38 For the individual inventor and
small business that may be less likely to commercialize an
invention outside of the United States, however, the value of
such potential global patent protection is probably less
important, and, consequently, smaller inventors and
universities will tend to contest the proposed legislation.39
While various interest groups have taken sides in the
debate surrounding the proposed legislation,40 the ultimate
impact of a change to a first-to-file standard on individual and
small businesses versus large corporations is uncertain. On
one hand, such a change will place individual inventors and
small businesses at a disadvantage because they have fewer
resources and less knowledge about the system to compete
effectively in a first-to-file regime.41 On the other hand, just as
Nov. 23, 2003) (stating the goal of promoting harmonization and making it
easier for American intellectual property holders to obtain international
protection); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Statement of Intent on Patent
Law
Harmonization,
Feb.
5,
2005,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak08feb2005.htm (stating desire
“to consider: (i) substantive patent law harmonization issues, notably the
Trilateral ‘first package,’ as developed by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office”).
37. See Kaminski, supra note 36.
38. See Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 9, 14-15 (1992).
39. See Letter from Ronald J. Riley, President, Professional Inventors
Alliance USA, to Editor of the Washington Post (July 8, 2005), available at
http://www.piausa.org/patent_reform/letters/ron_riley_07_08_2005; see also
Eric Chabrow, Fairness V. Efficiency, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 21, 2006,
available
at
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180205517.
40. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 522 n.7.
41. See Conley, supra 27, at 785-87; James E. White, The U.S. First-toInvent System, the Mossinghoff Conclusion, . . . and Statistics, 85 J. PAT. &
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in the rest of the business world, individual inventors and
small businesses are more nimble and may benefit from the
advantage of less bureaucracy in deciding more quickly than
large organizations whether to file patent applications and on
which patent applications to focus their resources.42
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FIRST-TO-FILE
STANDARD FOR THE UNITED STATES
A. FIRST-TO-INVENT ENCOURAGES GREATER PATENT QUALITY
Contrary to the arguments advanced for adopting a firstto-file standard in the United States as a way to improve
patent quality, there are more compelling arguments for why a
first-to-file standard in the United States would actually
decrease patent quality in the long term.
With respect to quality as measured by the validity and the
clarity of the claims that define an invention in a patent
application, it is easy to understand how permitting a longer
period of time to pass from the date of an invention to the date
of filing a corresponding patent application under a first-toinvent system will enable a greater opportunity for applicants
to submit more complete disclosures and better claims.
Whether patent applicants take advantage of the opportunity
afforded by this greater period of time in which to prepare a
better patent application is a question that more often turns on
the economics of the costs of preparing a patent application as
much as on the amount of time available for such preparation.
Similarly, additional time to draft the claims in a patent
application facilitates the ability to gather information from
prior art or the marketplace to better understand the scope to
which the inventor is entitled, thereby avoiding the need to use
a shotgun approach to drafting claims.43 Additional time to file

TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 357, 362-64 (2003). While the overall costs of utilizing
a harmonized innovation reward system may be less on a global level,
adopting a first-to-file regime in the United States is likely to drive up the
costs of early-stage technology development by forcing more money and
resources to be expended earlier in the development process to prepare and
file patent applications before actually reducing the inventions to practice and
determining their usefulness or commercial viability.
42. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, A Sea Change in Patent Law, ABA J., Jan.
2006, at 51-52.
43. Without such information, patent attorneys are more likely to draft
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the patent application also permits applicants to assess the
economic value of their invention before proceeding with
pursuit of patent protection and incurring the associated filing
and legal fees.
Applicants are therefore afforded an
opportunity to self-screen their inventions for usefulness.
In contrast, the objective of a first-to-file patent system is,
in effect, to reward early filing and punish late filing.
Therefore, there is an inherent disincentive to prepare a careful
and thoughtful patent application in which the prior art is wellsearched and the claims of the invention are initially drafted to
overcome the prior art. Instead, the first-to-file system rewards
quick and short filings that disclose, for example, the details of
one aspect of an invention, but undertake no evaluation of
which features or benefits of the invention distinguish it over
the prior art.44 As a result, the disclosures tend to exhibit less
quality in terms of the teaching of the invention and the
validity and clarity of the claims. The claims are more likely to
be overly broad so as to read on prior art, or fail to provide
adequate notice to the public of their scope. In this way, a firstto-file patent system inherently results in more patent
applications having lower quality on average than a first-toinvent patent system.45 Likewise, the first-to-file regime takes
away the abovementioned self-screening opportunity.
Applicants in a first-to-file system who discover after filing that
their patent protection may not be worth pursuing will have
already incurred substantial costs, and may decide to continue
to prosecute the application in hopes that it might somehow
slip through an already overburdened patent office.
The European and Japanese patent offices are often held
up as having higher quality patent examinations than the U.S.
patent office; however, the reasons for this apparent higher
quality in terms of patent validity are largely unrelated to the
first-to-file patent system. The European and Japanese patent
systems do not have the same kinds of problems with patent
validity as the U.S. patent office in large part because of the

overly broad claims in order to avoid surrendering patentable subject matter,
as subject matter disclosed but not claimed is dedicated to the public. See
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
44. See Conley, supra note 27, at 788.
45. See Donald S. Chisum, Introduction, The Harmonization of
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 448 (1993); Taylor,
supra note 27, at 535.
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significant delay in prosecuting patent applications in both
systems—on average three to five years for the European
Patent Office46 and five to six years for the Japanese Patent
Office,47 where a request for examination does not even have to
be made until three years after the priority date of a patent
application.48 These delays, coupled with the annuity fees that
must be paid each year an application is pending and, in the
case of the European Patent Office, significantly higher filing
fees,49 serve as a self-screening process in which many patent
applications are either never filed or never examined because of
the expense of the process.50 The delays can further function to
improve the quality of patent examinations by providing time
for the settling out of prior art. In technology sectors where
multiple players are actively publishing, marketing, or
otherwise disclosing their technology, prior art sources can
become available during the additional time between the
patent filing date and examination.
Patent “quality” is a broad, multi-faceted concept most
often discussed in the abstract without any specific context that
would permit quantifiable measurement. Some of the different
aspects of patent quality that are entangled under the general
rubric of concerns about patent “quality” can be separated into:
(1) the validity of the issued claims (the “validity facet”), (2) the
discernability of the claim scope (the “notice facet”), (3) the
effectiveness of the patent at teaching the invention to society
46. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, HOW TO GET A EUROPEAN PATENT:
GUIDE FOR APPLICANTS PART ONE 9 (10th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/guiapp1/pdf/g1en_net.pdf.
47. See European Patent Office, Patent Information: Frequently Asked
Questions
About
Japan,
http://patentinfo.european-patentoffice.org/prod_serv/far_east/faq/japan/index.en.php#4 (last visited Mar. 23,
2006).
48. See id.
49. See Boulware et al., supra note 30; Helfgott, supra note 30.
50. See generally John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, Presentation at
the USPTO Town Hall Meeting (Feb. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focuspp.html
(stating that in response to USPTO rule changes that would drive up the costs
of prosecuting a patent application, patent applicants are expected to more
rigorously self-screen prior to filing for patent). Self-screening of this type is
perhaps the most effective way of culling out the large number of high
visibility “vanity” patents (for example, the side-to-side swinging patent, U.S.
Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000)) that are typically presented as the
poster-children for those attacking the quality of patents granted by the
USPTO.
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(the “teaching facet”), and (4) the value, or usefulness, of the
patented invention itself (the “value facet”).
Only by
identifying a given facet can there be any meaningful
discussion of a quantifiable measurement of that aspect of
patent quality.51 Regardless of which facet of patent quality is
considered, there is little evidence to support the theory that a
first-to-file system would improve patent quality.
B. FIRST-TO-FILE AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY
The patent laws of the European Union and Japan
implement an absolute novelty rule under which no grace
period is provided to applicants.52 As such, the inventor’s own
public activities prior to filing can prevent patentability. This
test, combined with the first-to-file regime, truly simplifies
assessing the relevant dates for determining patentability as
against prior art references and other prospective patentees.
All potentially invalidating events are compared against the
filing date.
The change to a first-to-file system proposed in the Patent
Reform Act of 2005 would not achieve the administrative
efficiency with respect to ascertaining the inventors’ rights of
priority presently enjoyed by the European and Japanese
patent offices. The proposed legislation retained the one-year
grace period that permits the inventor to file up to one year
Fact
after publication or commercialization activity.53
discovery would still be needed for establishing the dates of
pre-filing activity by the inventor. Indeed, first-to-invent
factual inquiries may well remain a part of U.S. patent law
under the proposed legislation. Thus, the detrimental effects
associated with the upheaval of the current law by the
proposed legislation are not tempered by any benefit of longterm improvement in administrative efficiency in assessing
relevant dates of activity affecting patentability.
Another difference between the proposed first-to-file
system for the United States and the first-to-file systems in
51. Various approaches have been proposed for quantifying or rating the
value of a patent. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Patent Quality Index,
Presentation at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (January 2006),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/pqi/documents/2006_1_presentation.pdf.
52. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 222; Japanese Patent Law, Law No.121 of 1959, § 29(1).
53. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005).
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Japan and Europe is the availability of a provisional patent
application in the United States.54 It is expected that a
common procedure that would be used under the proposed firstto-file system in the United States would be to quickly file an
initial disclosure (for example, the original invention disclosure
form from the inventor) as an initial provisional patent
application, and then follow it with a series of follow-on
provisional applications as further information about the
invention (such as engineering drawings, specifications, and
test results) develops. A regular utility application would then
be prepared prior to the one-year anniversary of the original
provisional application or just prior to the public disclosure of
the invention.
While such a string of running provisional applications
may seem like a reasonable way to deal with a first-to-file
system, the likely outcome will be not only increased costs for
preparing and filing multiple applications for the same
invention, but also increased costs to prosecute the cases,
especially in situations with two different lines of applications
by different inventors pursuing a similar invention. In these
situations, the USPTO will be forced to evaluate each string of
priority applications to determine which inventor was first to
make a filing that supported the claimed invention, a process
that would be known as an “inventor’s rights contest.”55 As a
result, the arguments advanced for the administrative
efficiencies achieved by adopting a first-to-file system in the
United States are not likely to be realized. Without these
administrative efficiencies, the more likely outcome will be an
overall decrease in patent quality and an increase in patent
application pendency for a larger percentage of those cases
which involve two or more parties contesting patent rights
related to the same or similar subject matter.
C. INTERFERENCES ARE NOT LESS EFFICIENT THAN INVENTORS’
RIGHTS CONTESTS
Some of the arguments advanced for adopting a first-to-file

54. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000) (“A provisional application for patent
shall be made or authorized to be made by the inventor, except as otherwise
provided in this title.”).
55. See H.R. 2795 § 3(i).
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system have targeted the current interference process.56
Implicit in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 is the assumption
that the “inventor’s rights contest” process proposed in the bill
will be simpler and more efficient than the current interference
process of determining who was the first to invent a claimed
invention. These arguments have focused on the decrease in
patent quality and increase in patent expenses and patent
application pendency that have historically been associated
with the long and tortuous process of using the interference
procedures to resolve disputes over who was the true first
inventor of an invention. For many reasons, the proposed
inventor’s rights contest is more likely to be a step backward,
rather than forward, in making the process of determining who
should be awarded a patent more efficient and predictable.
While historically interferences certainly deserved their
reputation as an arcane legal quagmire,57 recent changes have
significantly streamlined the interference process to make the
process more efficient and certain.58 More importantly, the
interference process is invoked only in those relatively few
cases where an issued patent and a pending patent application
have claims that are overlapping and the party with the later
filing date has evidence suggesting that they had invented the
claimed invention before the party with the earlier filing date.
In reality, interferences are declared for only about 100 of the
more than 376,000 patent applications filed each year.59 In
56. See, e.g., Hearing on Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality
Improvement Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property, 109th Cong. (April 20, 2005) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on
behalf
of
Genentech,
Inc.),
available
at
http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/houseoversight/042
005/prepared/kushan(dna).pdf; COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 107, 126 (Stephen A. Merrill et al.
eds., 2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem.
57. See, e.g., Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(referring to extensive interference proceedings lasting over twelve years).
58. See Bruce H. Stoner, Jr., Official Gazette Notice, Interference Practice
– New Procedures for Handling Interference Cases at the Board of Patent
Appeals
and
Interferences
(Nov.
6,
1998),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/1998/week48/patapp2.htm;
see
also Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.200-41.208 (2005).
59. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/process/fy2004.htm (reporting
that eighty-six inter partes cases were declared by the Board of Patent Appeals
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these rare situations, the parties would have to undertake
discovery to resolve which inventor had the best-documented
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the claimed
invention. For more than 99.9% of patent applicants, there is
no need to resort to this kind of procedure to establish whether
the applicant should be entitled to a patent.
Under the proposed inventor’s rights contest process, it is
very likely that an equivalent determination to an interference
will be necessary for overlapping rights, but this will happen
more often, not less often, than interferences for two reasons.
First, the strategy of filing strings of running provisional
applications is likely to become more popular and therefore the
potential for “documented” overlap will increase, not decrease.
Second, the incentives that create the rush to get provisional
patent applications on file will increase the likelihood that
there are legitimate disputes over which provisional application
actually first legitimately enabled a given claimed invention by
providing a sufficient description of the claimed invention.
Instead of affording inventors and their attorneys time to
prepare careful and thoughtful patent applications—as is
encouraged by the first-to-invent system—the first-to-file
system encourages and rewards hasty and piecemeal filings for
the sake of preserving a filing date.
The proposed first-to-file system will place the burden on
each and every applicant to create multiple, prompt patent
application filings in order to be in the best position to defend
their rights to a claimed invention. As such, all applicants will
now bear the increased costs of defending their rights by
making early filings. In contrast, the current first-to-invent
system allows inventors to either file quickly or to rely on
internal documentation of an invention and development
process to preserve their rights to a claimed invention. Only in
those very few situations where there are actual interferences
under the current law is it necessary for patent applicants and
owners to bear the costs of defending their rights to inventions
for which they believe they were the earlier inventors.

and Interferences in fiscal year 2004); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, tbl.2 (2004),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2004/060402_table2.html
(listing 376,810 patent applications filed in fiscal year 2004).
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VI. BETTER IDEAS FOR IMPROVING PATENT QUALITY
Even though the first-to-invent system may seem like a
quaint anachronism whose time has passed, in reality, under
the distributed innovation reward system in the United States,
the first-to-invent standard provides for a more efficient and
higher quality patent system than a first-to-file system. By
giving inventors and attorneys more time to prepare patent
applications, the quality of the patent applications should be
better than would be the case under a first-to-file system. If
improving patent quality is the true objective, full funding of
the USPTO, increased filing fees, and deferred examinations
are much better solutions with proven track records in both
Europe and Japan. While the recent proposed USPTO rule
changes are certain to be the subject of much discussion and
objection by the patent bar,60 these proposed rule changes are
good examples of ways in which improvements to efficiency of
patent prosecution can be achieved without resorting to a firstto-file system.
Certainly there is room for improving our first-to-invent
system to remove disadvantages for international inventors
and to make the standards clearer on what constitutes prior
art.
There is also merit in enacting more well-defined
standards for the obviousness of an invention and even
adopting the equivalent of claiming standard or style sheets61
60. See e.g., Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for
Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably
Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1). Both proposed rule changes attempt to impose certain
limitations on prosecution of patent applications, both in terms of the number
of claims submitted in a given application and in terms of the number of
continuing applications that would be permitted for any given family of patent
applications. The proposed rule change in 71 Fed. Reg. 48, limiting the
number of continuing applications to one as a matter of right without
obtaining permission of the Commissioner, will clearly cut down on the
number of continuing applications. The proposed rule change in 71 Fed. Reg.
61, requiring submission of an onerous examination support document for any
applications having more than ten independent or dependent claims
designated for initial examination, will certainly serve as a deterrent to
applications with large numbers of claims. Whether either of these proposed
rule changes will ultimately be adopted is an open question, especially in the
case of the limitation on the number of continuing applications, which appears
to be in tension with both existing case law precedent and statutory authority.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C §§ 119-120 (2000); In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253 (1968).
61. The argument that inventors and patent attorneys need an unfettered
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as other ways to improve the quality of patents issued by the
USPTO. The recent report by the Government Accountability
Office on patent quality and the USPTO provides ample ground
for making incremental changes to the patent laws and USPTO
without the need to abandon our first-to-invent patent
standard.62
VII. CONCLUSION
In the spirit of global harmonization, the Patent Reform
Act of 2005 attempted to settle the debate between the more
distributed, first-to-invent standard and the more centralized,
first-to-file standard by choosing the first-to-file standard as
the “better” regime. However, in the context of worldwide
innovation, the optimum theoretical and practical answer to
the question of which standard is better for global innovation
reward systems may well be “both.” Having a single approach
to rewarding innovation will necessarily channel innovation
into those models that are best suited for that approach.
Because innovation is, by definition, a process of creating
something that is not presently known, it is antithetical to
presume that we can know with any certainty the single best
system to encourage innovation.
Even though there may be some level of increased costs
associated with using different standards for patentability in
different countries across the world, both individuals and
companies with any significant business presence outside the
United States have learned how to effectively use a worldwide
patent system with different standards in different countries.
Because of the higher costs of obtaining protection outside the
United States and because of the differences in potential
market size and the adoption of different innovations,
companies and inventors tend to self-select which innovations

license in deciding how to craft claims defining an invention is simply an
unsupportable fiction. The overwhelming majority of inventions today are
improvements of and refinements to existing technologies made in fields
where terminology and claim styles can be standardized without any
significant sacrifice to the ability of inventors and patent attorneys to define
inventions.
62. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: KEY
PROCESSES FOR MANAGING PATENT AUTOMATION STRATEGY NEED
STRENGTHENING
(2005),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05336.pdf.
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should be pursued in which countries based on the particular
marketing and competitive pressures unique to that company
or inventor.
In industries where the bulk of the marketplace is in the
United States, international patent protection is generally
relegated to the backseat in terms of any kind of enforcement
or licensing of patents. Harmonizing patent standards will
tend to reduce the beneficial effects of this kind of country-bycountry self-selection process for patent protection and actually
encourage economic inefficiency by making it easier for patents
to be mechanically propagated throughout the world without a
well-defined business objective for each jurisdiction.63 While
reformers may argue for the benefits of global harmonization of
patent standards, the reality is that the world is better served
by having different approaches to rewarding innovation in
different countries.
There is good counsel in the old adage “Haste makes
waste.” Those considering the first-to-file provisions proposed
in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 should heed this advice as
they decide whether to make the most significant change to the
U.S. patent laws in the history of our country. The rush to file
that will result from a first-to-file patent system is a haste that
will mean more waste for the U.S. inventor and the U.S.
economy, all for the sake of a supposedly easier patent system
for multinational corporations in the global economy.
The U.S. patent system has led the way for the last two
centuries in encouraging not only innovation, but also
investment in entrepreneurship and new technologies. With
more than two-thirds of the capitalized value of publicly traded
companies now representing intangible intellectual property
assets, it is critically important to carefully consider whether
we should fall in line with Europe and Japan for a first-to-file
patent system, or whether, perhaps, we should be willing to
accept the long-term inefficiencies inherent in maintaining
different systems throughout the world for rewarding
innovation in favor of maintaining our distributed innovation
system.
63. Examples of this economic inefficiency resulting from mechanically
pursuing patent protection in countries where there is no appreciable
marketplace for the patented technology include the cost borne by the
patentee of procuring these needless patents, and the social costs endured by
countries associated with the patent rights (such as encumbrance on
development of derivative technologies by third parties).

